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Abstract
Despite the continuous efforts to mitigate spam, the volume of such messages continues to grow and identifying
spammers is still a challenge. Spam traffic analysis is an important tool in this context, allowing network administrators
to understand the behavior of spammers, both as they obfuscate messages and try to hide inside the network. This
work adds to that body of information by analyzing the sources of spam to understand to what extent they explain
the traffic observed. Our results show that, in many cases, an Autonomous System (AS) represents an interesting
neighborhood to observe, with most ASes falling into four basic types: heavy and light senders, which tend to have
many or very few spammer machines respectively, frequent small offenders, where spammer machines appear every
now and then but disappear in a short time, and conniving ASes, where most machines do not send spam, but a few
are heavy, continuous senders. Not only that, but also by grouping machines based on the campaigns that they send
together, we define the notion of SpamBands. Those bands identify groups of machines that are probably controlled
by the same spammer, and our findings show that they often span multiple ASes. The identification of AS
neighborhood types and SpamBands may simplify the combat against spam, focusing efforts at the sources as a
whole, possibly improving blacklists by grouping machines found in a same AS or SpamBands.
Keywords: Spam traffic; Autonomous system; Network bad neighborhoods
1 Introduction
In the last two decades, there has been a steady increase
in the use of Internet, which led to an increase of the
problems related to the sending of spam messages. In
addition to the large volume of data generated, since the
email service providers estimate that between 40% and
80% of electronic messages are spam, many times they are
related to the propagation of phishing [1] andmalware [2].
Because of those factors, the losses caused by spam traffic
are estimated in billions of dollars [3].
To try to counter those effects, the battle against spam-
mers takes place on several fronts. For example, much
has been done to develop filters based on message con-
tent, defining rules to identify patterns of obfuscation
observed in spam messages [4]. Besides that, in recent
years, multiple efforts have focused on understanding
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spam traffic within the network. The goal in that case is
to find elements that can be used to identify the machines
that send the messages before they traverse the network
and consume resources of mail servers at the destina-
tion. This work fits in this line, analyzing where are the
machines used by spammers.
Recently, the term Internet BadNeighborhoods was cre-
ated to identify contiguous ranges of IP address space that
contain a significant number of machines with unwanted
behavior [5]. The principle behind the original concept
was that machines with similar (bad) behavior that shared
an IP prefix would suggest they belong to a same net-
work with problems. Later, the concept was extended to
refer to network segments propagating unwanted traf-
fic, regardless of the number of machines involved [6].
The granularity chosen for those analysis was that of /24
address ranges.
Our analysis is based on similar principles, but we
chose the level of Autonomous Systems (AS) to identify
possible bad neighborhoods. Autonomous Systems, by
nature, identify an IP address range under the control
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of a single entity responsible for defining usage policies,
routing, and administrative procedures to be applied to
all machines installed in that range. In this sense, two IP
addresses belonging to the same AS would have a much
greater chance of exhibiting similar behavior than two
IP addresses on subnets with adjacent addresses (the IP
space), but belonging to different ASes. After all, an AS
with security flaws in its policies is at risk of becoming
a potential Bad Neighborhood, since the probability of
machines belonging to that AS being infected and starting
to send spam is high. It should be pointed, though, that
some ASes may be under split management; that could
be better treated by considering BGP announced prefixes,
but that information was not available in the collected
data.
Our data contain spam traffic collected at various points
around the globe, which gives us multiple vantage points
over the network. By grouping the machines that generate
the traffic based on their origin AS, we created a profile of
the behavior of each Autonomous System observed dur-
ing the experiment. Our results show that the majority of
machines sending spam are concentrated in a few ASes
and that only 15 of them are responsible for over 80% of
the observed traffic. By using data mining techniques, we
observed that there are similarities between some of them,
and that it is possible to group them in four categories rep-
resenting the AS from the point of view of their role in the
distribution of spam. This finding is one of the main con-
tributions of this work, since, until then, it was common to
assume that there would be only two types of generators of
spam: “light” and “heavy” transmitters. Our characteriza-
tion indicates that in addition to spam-free and bad neigh-
borhoods (where bad behavior — spamming — is quite
common), there are also good neighborhoods, where such
behavior is not the norm, but appears from time to time,
usually rapidly disappearing shortly after its appearance in
one or another machine, and conniving neighborhoods,
where misbehaving machines were not widespread, but
limited to only a few hosts, which tend, however, to be
heavy senders.
2 Related work
This work analyzes spam based on its behavior as seen
“inside the network”, not based on data from destina-
tion mail servers. In that sense, it relates to the works
of Ramachandran and Feamster [7], one of the first to
study spam from network-level features. Although we
consider such features, since we have access to the spam
content, we combine different views. Duan, Gopalan
and Yuan [8] have recently provided a similar analysis,
although based on a single point of observation (a large
university campus).
The definition of Bad Neighborhoods, mentioned in
the introduction, is due to van Wanrooij and Pras, who
proposed the concept as an extension of the use of black-
lists in the spam detection [5]. In their study, each 24-bit
IP prefix (/24) would be a neighborhood and bad neigh-
borhoods would be those with a large number of machines
sending spam. Moreira Moura et al. [6] focused on the
analysis of these neighborhoods and extended the defi-
nition to include IP networks with few transmitters, but
with a high volume of traffic, following the classification
of “heavy” and “light” transmitters previously proposed
by Pathak, Hu and Mao [9]. In our work, we observe
that each AS can be seen as a neighborhood, because an
autonomous system naturally defines an area with simi-
lar machines, since there is a unique management for the
whole AS and a common routing policy for all machines.
Many studies analyze spam traffic using messages col-
lected at the destination mail servers. Gomes et al. [10]
showed features that can be used to separate legitimate
messages from spam messages, using data collected from
only one specific point of the network. In this work, spam
messages were collected by low-interaction honeypots
installed in 10 different countries and located in tran-
sit networks. This provided a more global view of spam
traffic, offering a different perspective.
Kokkodis and Faloutsos [11] showed results that indi-
cate that the activities of botnets are scattered in the
IP address space, reducing the effectiveness of anti-spam
filters based on addresses and hindering the work of net-
work administrators. Our work, despite confirming the
existence of spammers in a very large number of networks,
shows that most of the spam messages come from a small
number of ASes, a result that can be used in the devel-
opment of new techniques for spam detection, as in the
design of initiatives to act against such sources.
Some of our analysis is based on the concept of spam
campaigns. Our definition is based on the identification
of frequent patterns in the content, using data mining
techniques [12]. Other approaches have been proposed,
like the use of regular expressions [13]. Our approach fits
better with our processing pipeline, where multiple data
mining algorithms are applied to derive different views,
such as those in this paper.
This paper is based on previous work, so far available
only in Portuguese. In a first paper [14], we performed a
detailed analysis of spam messages collected over three
months around the world to observe Bad Neighborhoods.
With the same dataset, we developed the concept of
SpamBands [15], another way to analyze the origin of
spammers. (All the major concepts from those papers are
included here, to provide a complete source in English).
In the current work we extend our analysis of both con-
cepts to cover data from approximately one year, and
for the first time we use both concepts, Neighborhoods
and SpamBands, to study the relationship between them.
That allowed us to identify new patterns, such as the
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strong correlation between IP addresses in SpamBands
and bad neighborhoods, and a topological relationship
among spammers, since the IP addresses from a Spam-
Band usually come from just a few ASes.We hope that our
findings can help drive the spam community’s efforts to
combat spammers closer to their origin.
3 Methodology
Three aspects of our methodology deserve attention: the
collection architecture, and our techniques to identify
spam campaigns, and to define SpamBands. They are
presented next.
3.1 Collection infrastructure
The dataset used in this work was collected using twelve
low-interaction honeypots [16] installed in ten different
country codes: two in Brazil, two in the United States
and one in each of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Ecuador,
Netherlands, Norway, Taiwan and Uruguay. That means
we had collectors present in four different continents,
allowing the study to have a global view of spam traffic. By
doing that, we avoided the problem of location bias, which
may be present in several studies in the literature, whose
data often come from a single collection point. Further-
more, none of the honeypots used in the analysis showed
any signs of having been subjected to any form of attack.
The honeypots used in this paper are machines that
simulate machines of interest to spammers, such as open
SMTP mail relays and HTTP and SOCKS open proxies.
Their goal is to lure spammers to identify them as vul-
nerable machines and use them to try to deliver spam
messages. In practice, the honeypots do not deliver spam
messages to the intended recipients; instead, they are
stored locally and periodically collected to a central stor-
age. The behavior of honeypots, however, is such that it
makes the spammer believe that the delivery was suc-
cessful. That is corroborated by the fact that each most
machines continues to abuse the honeypots for all the
collection period.
It should be noted that our analysis is guided by the
traffic that was directed to our honeypots. There may be
spammers that do notmake use of proxies/relays to deliver
their messages, and those are not considered in this anal-
ysis. However, is highly unlikely that a heavy spammer,
using a dedicated server farm, would remain in activity
without such a technique: it would be easily identified
by black lists and blocked, since it uses few origin IP
addresses. On the other hand, if a botnet delivers spam
directly to the target mail servers all the time, we would
not see it in our data.
Along with each message received, additional informa-
tion is collected and stored by the system. This infor-
mation includes the protocol used by the spammer to
connect to the honeypot, (SMTP, HTTP or SOCKS), the
network prefix and AS of origin, the status of the source IP
in blacklists like Spamhaus XBL and PBL at the moment
each message was delivered, among others. All that is
obtained at the time the message is received, so that we
have a snapshot of things as they were at the moment the
spammer tried to send each message. Thus, our analy-
sis considers the information available at the time of the
transmission and not during a later query, which could
cause error. That is essential, for example, for the analy-
sis of black list contents, which might change between the
time of collection and analysis.
Later, during the analysis, some ASes deserved further
study. In those cases, based on their AS numbers, we gath-
ered data available on the Internet to get more details
about their activities. Based on the activities that were
identified during that search, we classified the ASes as
providers (general, DSL, corporative), hosting/co-location
services, etc.
3.2 Spam campaigns and spam bands
To better understand the behavior of spammers, we used
the concept of spam campaigns. A campaign is a set
of messages that share a common goal (similar con-
tent) and a common dissemination strategy [12]. We
used the FPCluster algorithm to group messages based
on their various attributes and to identify the obfusca-
tion strategies used. That algorithm builds a frequent
pattern tree, which is then used to extract the message
clustering patterns, which in turn identify the campaigns
[12,17].
Through the identification of campaigns, we detect the
influence of each orchestrated campaign on the spam traf-
fic collected, as well as the emergence of new IP addresses
that join a given campaign. Based on those observations,
Fazzion et al. [15] developed a method that can identify
groups of transmitters that are correlated, called Spam-
Bands. Since that work was published in Portuguese, the
method is described here for completeness.
The premise of SpamBands was that machines which
generate the same campaigns are controlled by the same
orchestrator, being related in terms of dissemination strat-
egy used. Thus, a SpamBand is a group of machines
that works together on the same set of campaigns. The
relationship between machines and campaigns can be
modeled as a graph G, where the machines are vertices
and there is an edge between two machines if they sent
messages associated with the same campaign. Figure 1
illustrates the construction of this graph.
From G, we can define a SpamBand as a dense sub-
graph that can be obtained by several clustering algo-
rithms in graphs in the literature which can be quite
complex and hard to calibrate [18]. Our strategy is more
simple and interactive. Initially, each SpamBand is a con-
nected component.
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Figure 1 SpamBand graph construction. The graph represents IP addresses that sent spam as vertices. There is an edge between two vertices if
they took part in the same spam campaign.
In some cases, however, one IP address may be found
connected to more than one such sub-graph. That may be
due to IP address reassignment, or use of NAT. To handle
that, in a second moment, we evaluate those cases, which
can require the split of certain connected components in
order to isolate subgraphs with higher density.
The process to identify SpamBands is presented in
Algorithm 1. The algorithm receives three parameters:
the graph (G), the minimum threshold betweenness to
be considered (threshold_bt) and the maximum number
of IP addresses that can be removed in order to split a
connected component (threshold_ips).
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The first step is to determine the connected compo-
nents in G which constitute the initial approximation
of the SpamBands. Next, we identify dense sub-graphs
in each connected component exploring the betweenness
concept, which measures the centrality degree of a node
in the graph. This metric indicates the number of short-
est paths among all pair of nodes in the graph that
pass through a given node. Our premise is that when
some nodes have a high value of betweenness, beyond
what would be expected for a strongly connected graph,
chances are that those nodes are connecting two (or more)
sub-graphs which are, themselves, internally dense. Thus,
by removing those nodes, we are emphasizing the separa-
tion of those internally dense sub-graphs. This removal is
based on the parameters threshold_bt, which is the lower
bound of betweenness that a node may have in order to be
removed, and threshold_ips, which defines a maximum
threshold of the number of nodes that can be removed
in order to split a component. Algorithm 1 initially veri-
fies which nodes satisfy the betweenness threshold in each
connected component and next verifies if their removal
does not lead very small graphs. If it is possible to remove
the nodes, each resultant component is inserted in S. If
not, the current component is inserted in S. The algorithm
returns the set S which holds all SpamBands.
4 Collected data
Our analysis considers approximately one year of collec-
tion, from May 9, 2012, until March 31, 2013, resulting in
nearly four billion messages (14 TB). By analyzing a large
period, we avoid any impact due to an atypical behavior,
which could occur in a short period of time.
Table 1 shows an overview of the data collected by the
twelve honeypots and used in the study, broken down by
the protocol used by the spammers. During the period
of almost a year, 3.97 billion messages were collected,
which correspond to 14 TB of data. The addresses of the
machines that sent spam were associated with 149 differ-
ent country codes, which corresponded to about 60% of
all country codes. We can also notice a large number of
autonomous systems, 3,226, showing that the collection
included many subnets of origin.
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Table 1 Global vision of the data
SMTP SOCKS HTTP Total
Messages
(x106)
690 (17.4%) 2,486 (62.5%) 799 (20.1%) 3,976
IP addresses 294,072 34,397 11,449 328,050
Autonomous
systems
3,096 443 55 3,226
Country
codes
146 66 14 149
Volume (GB) 2,564 8,522 3,378 14,464
The number of IP addresses using SOCKS and HTTP
protocol is much smaller when compared to the number
of IP addresses that used the SMTP protocol. Never-
theless, the number of messages sent using HTTP and
SOCKS is larger. This shows that there is not a direct
relationship between the number of machines and the
number of messages sent. This division is a sign of the
differentiation between spammers: some adopt strategies
based on high volume over a certain protocol, while oth-
ers may send lower volumes, using more machines, over
another protocol. In fact, during our analysis we will see
that there are more factors to be considered.
5 Neighborhood analysis
In this work, we advocate that ASes can be used for the
identification of the limits of the neighborhoods, instead
of /24 prefixes, as used in the original definition [5]. That
provides a more natural aggregation of addresses, given
that fixed-length prefixes are not adequate for all cases.
To show that, in Table 1 we observe that spammessages
come from many different networks, since 3,226 distinct
autonomous systems appeared in the collected data. It is
interesting to notice that most of those spam messages
were sent by a very small number of autonomous systems,
being fifty of them responsible for over 85% of all traffic.
Thus, analyzing the behavior of spam at the source can
direct the efforts to fight spam as it can identify which
are the neighborhoods that have worst behavior, and,
consequently, that are more likely to send spam messages.
5.1 Distribution of IP addresses in autonomous systems
Figure 2(a) shows that for the majority of Autonomous
Systems, only a few devices were seen contacting the
honeypots. In almost 90% of the ASes, the number of
machines observed was smaller than 20. In Table 2, we
can clearly see the existence of a large group of AS
with a small number of IP addresses sending spam mes-
sages and another group, smaller, which contains most
of those addresses. This shows that the machines that
send spam messages are not evenly distributed across the
Autonomous Systems.
Those ASes that have fewer than 10 machines that send
spam, account for over 83% of the total. Nevertheless, they
send only 7.66% of the messages and correspond in num-
ber of machines to 1.7% of the total. Thus, we believe
that in terms of neighborhoods, these AS are not char-
acterized as bad neighborhoods, but that their security
policies are being implemented correctly, because of the
small number of spamming IP addresses and the low vol-
ume of traffic generated by them. On the other hand, 95
autonomous systems (2.94%) have more than 319,000 IP
addresses in the dataset (97.41%) and are responsible for
71% of traffic from spam, which corresponds to almost 3
billion messages. Those neighborhoods show bad behav-
ior, possibly due to weak security policies. Thus, direct
efforts to understand and improve the behavior of those
networks might have impact on the overall traffic.
Figure 2 also shows the distribution of IP addresses
present in each blacklist. The two black lists consid-
ered here are XBL, which lists IP addresses detected as
infected, and PBL, which lists IP ranges declared by ISPs
as being used for dynamic hosts — which should not send
mail directly. Finally, we consider IPs that were not found
in any of the blacklists considered (No BL). There is a very
small number of Autonomous Systems that do not have IP
addresses in XBL, about 15%, as we can see in Figure 2(b).
In addition, approximately 60% of the ASes have all their
IP addresses in XBL. This result makes us believe that
most IP addresses are detected by the XBL, but what hap-
pens is that a good portion of the ASes listed there (49%)
have only one spamming IP address (therefore, 100% of
their addresses are in the XBL).
Considering that, the information about the IP
addresses that are in the PBL and those who do not par-
ticipate in any blacklist (nobl) end up getting distorted, as
shown in Figures 2 (c) and 2 (d). In the graph of Figure 2
(c), for example, more than 70% of autonomous systems
have no IP address present in the PBL, but more than
85% of IP addresses found in the period of analysis are in
PBL as shown in Table 3. The IP addresses that are not in
any blacklist, belong mostly to a few ASes, and represent
a very small portion of the IP addresses, less than 12%.
However, this small number of machines is responsible
for over 68% of all spam traffic, as shown in Table 3.
5.2 Analysis of neighborhoods with higher transmission
power
Table 4 shows the 15 ASes that sent the most spam
messages in the period analyzed, being, by themselves,
responsible for more than 80% of all spam traffic. This
information can be incorporated into spam filters and
used by network administrators to reduce the volume of
spam, sincemessages sent by those AS tend to be spam. By
analyzing them, in spite of the fact that all send a large vol-
ume of spam, we see that there are some neighborhoods
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Figure 2 Distribution of active IP numbers per AS, as well as the distribution of the number of IPs from an AS present in the XBL, PBL black lists (or
not present in any BL). (a) CDF of the number of IP addresses per AS. (b) CDF of the percentage of IP addresses in XBL per AS. (c) CDF of the
percentage of IP addresses in PBL per AS. (d) CDF of the percentage of IP addresses that are not in any blacklist per AS.
that have very different characteristics from each other.
On the other hand, it is possible to notice that some
of them are very similar, although they have no direct
relationship.
Some autonomous systems (10297 and 29802) have sim-
ilar characteristics in virtually all aspects. They have a
small number of IP addresses in our dataset, most of them
using SOCKS and HTTP protocols to send spam, and do
not belong to any blacklist. AS 2497 is also very similar,
despite having a larger number of machines. AS 4725, in
turn, differs only by having a large number of IP addresses
in PBL blacklist. The machines of those neighborhoods
Table 2 Number of IP addresses observed per AS
IP addr. per AS (x) #AS #Msgs (x106) #IP addr.
x = 1 1,581 (49.0%) 108 (2.7%) 1,581 (0.5%)
x <10 2,705 (83.9%) 305 (7.7%) 5,635 (1.7%)
x <50 3,061 (94.9%) 797 (20.0%) 13,309 (4.6%)
x <100 3,131 (97.1%) 1,150 (28.9%) 18,159 (5.5%)
x≥ 100 95 (2.9%) 2,825 (71.1%) 319,554 (97.4%)
behave like dedicated servers used to send spam: they use
SOCKS and HTTP protocols, meaning they do not con-
tact any mail host directly (only through proxies), each
sends a large number of messages, and most of them are
not in any blacklist.
In contrast, we find some neighborhoods with com-
pletely different characteristics, such as Autonomous Sys-
tems 3462 and 4134. Both have more than 100,000 IP
addresses in our dataset, the vast majority of machines
observed used the SMTP protocol to send spam and most
of them were in some blacklist. In addition, AS 4134
has very striking features, with more than 99% of their
IP addresses sending spam messages using the SMTP
protocol and about 17,000 of them in XBL.
Table 3 Overview of blacklists
#IP addresses #Messages (106)
XBL 66,388 (20.2%) 594 (14.9%)
PBL 282,599 (86.2%) 789 (19.8%)
No BL 41,005 (12.5%) 2,714 (68.3%)
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Table 4 15most important autonomous systems
AS Msgs (106) IP addr. IP SMTP IP SOCKS IP HTTP IP XBL IP PBL IP No BL vol. (GB) Classification
10297 1.857 182 22.5% 77.5% 77.5% 17.0% 0.0% 83.0% 5,475 hosting/co-location
3462 359 100,395 78.7% 22.1% 6.8% 7.7% 99.8% 0.1% 1,320 DSL/ISP
29802 298 25 16.0% 84.0% 84.0% 12.0% 0.0% 88.0% 781 hosting
9299 148 82 39.0% 61.0% 26.8% 34.2% 1.2% 65.9% 342 DSL/business
2497 141 1,185 0.2% 99.6% 99.0% 0.2% 19.4% 80.4% 559 hosting/clouding
4134 126 110,123 99.7% 0.3% 0.2% 15.8% 81.8% 17.1% 2,446 DSL
6648 124 54 9.3% 90.7% 40.7% 9.3% 90.7% 1.9% 279 DSL/business
4725 31 215 0.9% 99.1% 98.6% 0.9% 95.8% 3.3% 120 clouding/business
27699 31 1,382 7.7% 92.3% 0.0% 9.2% 95.2% 2.7% 114 DSL/business
18881 28 3,091 10.7% 89.3% 0.0% 8.6% 96.1% 2.0% 97 co-location/ISP
8167 25 198 38.9% 61.1% 0.0% 37.4% 34.8% 41.4% 95 clouding/ISP
4837 23 20,551 99.9% 0.1% 0.0% 26.5% 78.4% 18.5% 97 -
9924 22 1,959 1.3% 82.1% 98.6% 2.8% 99.6% 0.1% 77 -
28573 21 700 75.7% 24.3% 0.0% 46.9% 98.4% 0.9% 76 ISP
4230 20 429 21.7% 78.3% 78.3% 31.0% 67.6% 11.0% 67 hosting/ISP
5.3 Grouping of autonomous systems
Because of the evidence mentioned in Section 5.2, we
looked for a way to group the AS observed and classify
them according to their characteristics. For this, we use
the X-means clustering algorithm [19], considering the
characteristics of each neighborhood as attributes. The
algorithm has the quality of automatically setting the opti-
mum number of clusters to use, unlike other clustering
algorithms.
To perform the clustering, we used as features the char-
acteristics that better represent the Autonomous Systems
in our analysis. The attributes carry information such as
number of IP addresses observed, number of messages per
day, percentage of the IP addresses in blacklists, percent-
age of IP addresses using each protocol, and the average
number of messages sent per IP address. Those attributes
proved to be a good set to identify the neighborhoods,
because they define the major elements of behavior that
machines on those networks can present.
Table 5 exhibits the properties of each of the four groups
generated. Group 1 contains 64% of the ASes, and most of
them have a very small number of observed IP addresses.
Most of the machines in that group use SMTP proto-
col and are in XBL. Group 2 also has a small number of
IP addresses, but it is responsible for most of the spam
sent (65%). In addition, more than 98% of the messages
were sent using SOCKS and HTTP protocols, although
most of the IP addresses (84%) use the SMTP protocol
to send spam. The vast majority of messages (97%) was
sent by machines that were not in any blacklist. Group
3 differs from the others because more than 99% of its
IP addresses sent messages through the SMTP protocol
and most of them are in PBL and XBL. Finally, the fourth
group contains the ASes with a large number of machines
observed in the dataset. The majority of their IP addresses
are in PBL, and only a smaller number is in XBL. Although
most of the machines used SMTP, the highest volume of
spam was sent using the SOCKS protocol.
Table 5 Features of each group
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
ASes 2,064 449 359 354
Msgs (x106) 379 2,602 88 907
No. IP Addresses 8,426 16,024 11,503 301,760
Msgs/IP (x103) 45.0 162.4 7.6 3.0
Activity1 48.8 63.4 67.1 85.3
Msgs-SMTP 85.3% 1.5% 71.4% 29.2%
Msgs-SOCKS 13.5% 75.3% 23.2% 50.3%
Msgs-HTTP 1.2% 23.2% 5.4% 20.5%
Msgs-Xbl 81.9% 1.7% 68.6% 20.0%
Msgs-Pbl 2.8% 1.4% 52.0% 76.8%
Msgs-No-Bl 17.2% 97.2% 15.0% 11.7%
IPs-Xbl 83.5% 13.2% 64.7% 16.5%
IPs-Pbl 5.2% 12.9% 86.6% 89.5%
IPs-No-Bl 15.2% 77.7% 7.1% 8.8%
Volume (TB) 1.2 7.55 0.36 4.98
IPs-SMTP 97.43% 84.62% 99.19% 89.01%
IPs-SOCKS 2.67% 15.27% 0.82% 11.12%
IPs-HTTP 0.33% 9.52% 0.02% 3.44%
1Average of days, in the analyzed period, in which the machines of this group
were active.
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If we consider the neighborhoods that sent more spam
messages, studied in Section 5.2, we see that the clus-
tering placed ASes with similar characteristics in the
same group, and separated those with different behav-
iors. Autonomous Systems 10297, 29802, and 2497, whose
machines behave like dedicated servers, ended up in
group 2, responsible for most of the spam traffic, even
though having fewer IP addresses. Moreover, that group
has few machines in blacklists, which is a necessary fea-
ture for machines that send a large volume of messages —
otherwise they would not be effective.
Most machines from Autonomous Systems 3462 and
4134 behave like bots and those two neighborhoods are
part of the Group 4. That group includes ASes that have a
large number of IP addresses with most of them in black-
lists. It is also observed that most of the IP addresses in
that group sent a small amount of messages.
By analyzing the 15 neighborhoods highlighted in
Section 5.2, we found that none of them are in groups 1
or 3, as can be seen in Table 4. This result was already
expected, since the ASes in group 1 have a very small
number of IP addresses and those from group 3 have few
machines that send spam and are responsible for few spam
messages. Thus, the neighborhoods that send more spam
were allocated to the other two groups: ASes that have a
lot of IP addresses and those that send a large amount of
spam messages.
We believe these results may be used in at least two
important ways: to help guide policies used by different
network managers in the way they treat data from ASes
known to fall into a certain class, and to help the net-
work community to identify organizations that may be in
need of some orientation on how to handle their security
(those with a large number of low volume spamming IPs),
or those that may require some pressure to act against
server-heady spammers that may be among their clients.
5.3.1 Group 1
The graph in Figure 3(a) shows that a very small percent-
age of the neighborhoods of this group use the SOCKS
and HTTP protocols to send spammessages and that over
70% of the AS send less than 100 thousand of messages
in the period. Although the number of messages is small,
given that we collected for almost one year, we can see
in Table 5 that this group had a very small number of IP
addresses observed, resulting in a relatively high number
of messages by IP address.
The main characteristic of the ASes of this group is
the small number of spamming machines, as we can see
in Figure 3(b). Almost 60% of the Autonomous Systems
here have only a single IP address in the dataset and
none of them have more than one hundred IP addresses.
This explains why that group, even encompassing 64% of
the AS, is responsible for only 9.5% of the spam traffic
generated. Furthermore, most of the IP addresses in this
group are in XBL blacklist, which characterizes infected
machines, probably belonging to botnets.
The activity period of the machines in the AS of this
group show constant activity using the SMTP protocol in
almost all ASes, as shown in Figure 4(a). On the other
hand, the graph of Figure 4(c) shows that few ASes use
the HTTP protocol and only one used this protocol for
more than ten days. This large amount of messages sent by
SMTP protocol, along with a high number of IP addresses
in XBL, suggests the existence of bots. As there are few
committed IP addresses in these AS, it is possible that
those machines constitute exceptions in the security pol-
icy of an overall secure system and that, for some reason,
go unnoticed to the management of these networks.
5.3.2 Group 2
This group contains the ASes that sent more spam mes-
sages and together they are responsible for more than 65%
Figure 3 Distribution of messages sent and active IP numbers for ASes in group 1. (a) CDF of the number of messages sent per AS. (b) CDF of the
number of IP addresses per AS.
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Figure 4 Activity of Autonomous Systems in group 1, per protocol. (a) SMTP. (b) SOCKS. (c) HTTP. ASes appear ordered in the y axis. There is a mark
at position (x,y) if AS y was active on date x.
of all messages. As shown in Figure 5(a), 5% of the ASes
sent more than one million messages and are responsible
for most of the spam traffic. In this group, almost no mes-
sage is sent using the SMTP protocol, since 98% of the
messages were sent by SOCKS and HTTP protocols.
The Autonomous Systems in this group also have a
small number of spamming IP addresses — 57% of them
had only one IP address in the dataset. Moreover, a very
small percentage of neighborhoods here (2%) have more
than one hundred machines. However, even with a small
number of IP addresses, the average number of spam
messages sent by each of them is very large, more than
162 thousand, as can be seen in Table 5. Those fea-
tures (few machines, with heavy spam traffic) suggest
that most of the ASes here house machines that act as
dedicated servers to send spam, probably with the con-
nivance of the network administrators. In our opinion, an
unwanted bot that would start behaving that way would
not go unnoticed by a network administrator that did not
accept such practice, and it would not remain limited to
a few machines if the network administrator was careless
enough not to bother about it. One final interesting aspect
is that, in this group, most of the IP addresses are not in
any blacklist. Considering the volume of traffic they gener-
ate, that would only be possible if they consistently abuse
intermediary machines to hide from blacklist detection.
Compared to the other groups, the period of activity of
the AS using SOCKS and HTTP protocols are higher in
this group. We can see that there is a larger number of
ASes and they remain active for a longer period, as the
graphics of Figure 6 clearly shows.
As mentioned earlier, ASes 10297, 29802 and 2497 were
assigned to this group. Like others in the group, that were
studied, those AS are characterized by offering hosting
and co-location services, which would fit the profile just
described.
5.3.3 Group 3
Table 5 shows that in this group, over 70% of spam mes-
sages were sent using the SMTP protocol and the ASes
Figure 5 Distribution of messages sent and active IP numbers for ASes in group 2. (a) CDF of the number of messages sent per AS. (b) CDF of the
number of IP addresses per AS.
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Figure 6 Activity of Autonomous Systems in group 2, per protocol. (a) SMTP. (b) SOCKS. (c) HTTP. ASes appear ordered in the y axis. There is a mark
at position (x,y) if AS y was active on date x.
of the group are responsible for only 2.2% of all mes-
sages. The graph in Figure 7(a) shows that over 80% of
the neighborhoods here sent less than 200,000 messages,
explaining the fact that this group is responsible for a
smaller number of messages.
The graph in Figure 7(b) shows a similar behavior to
that seen in groups 1 and 2, but the number of ASes with
only one IP address is lower, just under 40%. What marks
this group is the large number of IP addresses that use
the SMTP protocol, over 99% of them, surpassing any
other group. In addition, about 64% of the machines in
this group are in XBL. This suggests the presence of bots,
but the low number of IP addresses suggests that there are
fewer compromised machines in those AS.
The graph in Figure 8(c) shows that only one AS of this
group sent spammessages by HTTP protocol, and just for
a short period of time. As expected, for the SMTP proto-
col, all the ASes were very active throughout the period,
as seen in Figure 8(a).
5.3.4 Group 4
From Figure 9(a) we can see that most of the ASes in this
group used the SMTP protocol to send spam, but the few
Autonomous Systems using SOCKS and HTTP protocols
sent more than one million messages. The neighborhoods
of this group are responsible for about 23% of all spam
traffic.
This group contains the ASes with the larger numbers
of machines observed, as can be seen in Figure 9(b), with
over 20% of neighborhoods with over 1,000 IP addresses,
in which some of them have more than 100,000 machines.
Thus, even accounting for much of the spam traffic, the
number of spam messages per IP address is the lowest
among the groups, only 3,000. Moreover, the great major-
ity of the IP address are in blacklists and use the SMTP
protocol. For all this, we have strong evidence thatmany of
the machines belonging to this group are part of botnets.
Because of the large number of machines in this situa-
tion, these AS are classified of bad neighborhoods, where,
Figure 7 Distribution of messages sent and active IP numbers for ASes in group 3. (a) CDF of the number of messages sent per AS. (b) CDF of the
number of IP addresses per AS.
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Figure 8 Activity of Autonomous Systems in group 3, per protocol. (a) SMTP. (b) SOCKS. (c) HTTP. ASes appear ordered in the y axis. There is a mark
at position (x,y) if AS y was active on date x.
apparently, management policies and network mainte-
nance are not able to prevent the proliferation of infected
machines.
Because the ASes in this group have a very large num-
ber of IP addresses, it is common for the same AS to show
the use of the three different protocols in the dissemina-
tion of spam. This behavior is explained by Figures 10(b)
and 10(c). It was expected an intense period of activity in
the use of the SMTP protocol, once machines belonging
to botnets tend to use this protocol. Therefore, the graph
of Figure 10(a) reinforces the suspicious about botnets.
ASes 3462 and 4134, which are part of this group,
have been classified as ISPs with DSL networks. This
suggests that the composition of this group is predomi-
nantly domestic users machines infected by some type of
malware.
6 SpamBands analysis
We applied the SpamBand identification algorithm
described in Section 3 to the data from each honeypot.We
found a total of 2618 SpamBands and the distribution of
those among the honeypots is shown in Figure 11(a). This
Figure reinforces the notion of orchestration by spam-
mers: all honeypots have a well-defined range of Spam-
Bands that attacked them each day, and the increase and
decrease in the number of SpamBands in that interval
suggests an orchestration in order to obfuscate the action
of groups of spammers.
Figure 11(b) shows a linear regression of the number
of SpamBands per day for each honeypot. The linear
trends reveal lines with low inclination (almost constant)
adding to the impression that the variation observed in
Figure 11(a) is regular and is due to some kind of obfusca-
tion. Another interesting result is about honeypot EC-01.
That honeypot was attacked by more SpamBands than
any other, although no clear reason for that was found.
Figure 12(a) shows that only 5% of SpamBands using
SOCKS or HTTP have more than 100 IP addresses, again
suggesting the use of dedicated infrastructure for send-
ing messages. In contrast, about 30% of total SpamBands
using SMTP have more than 100 IP addresses, which is
not surprising, since these are supposed to be botnets
Figure 9 Distribution of messages sent and active IP numbers for ASes in group 4. (a) CDF of the number of messages sent per AS. (b) CDF of the
number of IP addresses per AS.
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Figure 10 Activity of Autonomous Systems in group 4, per protocol. (a) SMTP. (b) SOCKS. (c) HTTP. ASes appear ordered in the y axis. There is a
mark at position (x,y) if AS y was active on date x.
that, in general, consist of a larger number of machines.
Observing Figure 12(b), we see an inversion: HTTP or
SOCKS SpamBands tend to send more messages than
SMTP ones. This happens precisely due to the fact previ-
ously mentioned. Since those who use SOCKS or HTTP
are probably dedicated servers, they use all their resources
to send a large number of messages. On the other hand,
those who use SMTP and are part of botnets can only send
spam moderately, to avoid their identification [20].
6.1 Relationship between SpamBands and ASes
In Figure 13, we can observe that the majority of Spam-
Bands, for all protocols, have IP addresses from just a
few ASes. This result indicates a topological relation-
ship among IP addresses of a SpamBand, where machines
from the same AS tend to send unwanted messages from
the same set of spam campaigns. Furthermore, the small
number of SpamBands that encompass IP addresses from
more than 60 neighborhoods use the SMTP protocol. This
result is expected, since SMTP is used by botnets, which
tend to have infected machines spread over more ASes.
6.1.1 SpamBands activities in different neighborhoods
As already mentioned, Autonomous Systems were classi-
fied in four groups, where groups 2 and 4 were considered
bad neighborhoods. The results in the chart of Figure 14
shows that half of the SpamBands (about 50%) have IP
addresses from Autonomous Systems that belong only to
groups 2 or 4. Then come SpamBands that use both hosts
in neighborhoods of type 2 and 4, and then those that use
only group 1. This confirms that the ASes were classified
correctly into those four groups and suggests that most
of the IP addresses in SpamBands are in bad neighbor-
hoods. Thus, this result points out that the efforts against
the spam abuse have to focus in Autonomous Systems that
are considered as bad neighborhoods.
Furthermore, most of SpamBands that contain AS from
group 2 usually use the HTTP or SOCKS protocol. This
Figure 11 SpamBands active in various honeypots over time. (a) The number of SpamBands found each day in eight different honeypots. (b) Their
linear regressions.
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Figure 12 Distribution of IPs present and messages sent by SpamBands. (a) CDF of the number of IP addresses per SpamBand. (b) CDF of the
number of messages sent per SpamBand.
was expected, once group 2 seems to have a lot of dedi-
cated server machines to send spam. On the other hand,
the SpamBands with AS in group 4 use the SMTP proto-
col. This result was also expected because most machines
in these neighborhoods seems to belong to botnets.
6.1.2 SpamBands clustering
In this section we analyze the clustering coefficient inside
the SpamBands to verify if IP addresses SpamBands inter-
act more with other IP addresses in their AS than with IP
addresses from others neighborhoods. The internal clus-
tering coefficient (ICC) of a SpamBand is the average of
the clustering coefficient in each AS considering only the
internal connections, i.e., connections among IP addresses
that belong to a same Autonomous System. On the other
hand, the external clustering coefficient (ECC) of a Spam-
Band takes the average of the clustering coefficient in
each AS considering only the external connections, i.e.,
connections among IP addresses of different Autonomous
Systems.
As shown in Figure 15, 55% of the SpamBands have ICC
higher than 0.3 while and only 42% have ECC higher than
this value. Moreover, as we can see, the standard behav-
ior is that each SpamBand have an ECC smaller than its
ICC. We conclude that inside a SpamBand, the relation-
ships between IP addresses which belong to a same AS are
Figure 13 Distribution of the number of AS per SpamBand. Show the distribution of the number of different AS that appears in a same SpamBand.


























HTTP or SOCKS and SMTP
Figure 14 SpamBands distribution over neighborhood types (AS groups). Shows how SpamBands are distributed over neighborhood types (AS
groups). The numbers on the x axis identify individual groups (1, 2, 3, 4) or combinations of two or three groups (e.g., 24 means a SpamBand has
members in ASes in neighborhood types identified by groups 2 and 4).
more intense. It suggests that there is a topological cor-
relation among IP addresses inside a SpamBand, showing
that Autonomous Systems are a good way to represent
neighborhoods.
7 Conclusions
Several efforts are under way to combat spam, but this task
has beenmade difficult due to the technical sophistication
of spammers. This paper tries to shed some light on
the sources of spam messages, to help the development
of techniques and policies to fight spam at its origin.
Our results show that, although spam messages are being
sent from various networks, most of the traffic is con-
centrated in a few Autonomous Systems, and that can
be used to identify spam sources and fight them. More-
over, we grouped ASes into four categories based on their
spam dissemination behavior. Those groups shown that
we can identify good and bad neighborhoods, some with
Figure 15 SpamBands clustering within ASes. Verification of the clustering coefficient SpamBand graphs when considered the AS borders: average
internal (within AS) and external (among ASes) clustering coefficientes.
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many infected machines, others with just a few on-and-
off senders that get shut down quickly, other which are
conniving with a few heavy spammers.
By identifying machines that participate together in
a spam campaign (SpamBands), we observed that most
campaigns originated from neighborhoods of a single
type, or may include hosts in the two types of heavy send-
ing neighborhoods at the same time. All that can be used
to identify major sources of spam to help stop that kind of
traffic.
As future work, we plan to conduct further analysis
on each of the neighborhood categories found to better
understand the differences among them.We also intend to
better understand the behavior of the category considered
good neighborhoods and check whether security policies
used to define the behavior of those autonomous systems
can serve as a model to others.
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